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NOTES
Separating Myth from Reality in
Federalism Decisions: A Perspective of
American Federalism-Past and Present
The question of the relation of the States to the federal government
. . . cannot, indeed, be settled by the opinion of any one generation,
because it is a question of growth, and eveiy successive stage of our




Many myths surround the American system of government.2
One such myth promotes the view that federalism is the paragon
which resolves the problem of ordering man in political society.
The myth has often been woven into the rhetoric of many mem-
bers of the various branches and levels of government.' It has been
retold throughout American history by opposing sides, each of
which has promoted its own interpretation of federalism as the
mythical paragon of government.4 The myth, however, is a concept
without form or substance, an ill-defined goal rather than a de-
tailed plan. The myth of federalism should not be confused with
the reality of federalism, which is the ever-evolving compromise
between those who argue for tilting the balance of functions and
powers in favor of either national or state government based on
1. T. WOODROW WILSON, CONsTITuTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 173
(1908).
2. See, e.g., Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693 (1974). Ely first
describes and then explodes thi myth that Erie stated the ideal standard for the relation of
the federal and state judiciaries.
3. See, e.g., Inaugural Address of President Ronald Reagan, 17 WEEKLY Con'. OF
PRES. Doc. No. 4, at 1, 2 (Jan. 20, 1981) ("It is my intention ... to demand recognition of
the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal Government and those reserved
to the States or to the people.").
4. See, e.g., Calhoun, The Fort Hill Address of John C. Calhoun: On the Relation
which the States and General Government Bear to Each Other, in WE THE STATES 277
(Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government ed. 1964).
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what they perceive as the advantages that flow from either form.'
Federalism's division of powers and functions among the several
levels of government6 represents a choice of social policy because
the division selected influences the general scope and focus of gov-
ernmental action.7 The Reagan Administration's call for a "New
Federalism"-a major reordering of national priorities and an
abrupt shift of governmental responsibilities from Washington to
the statesA-represents the most recent rhetorical confusion of the
myth of federalism as a paragon of government with the reality of
federalism as a process for implementing policy choices. As Morton
Grodzins, a prominent political scientist, has written, in practice
federalism is "a device for dividing decisions and functions of gov-
ernment. . . .It is a means, not an end."9
An issue of federalism has often been at the center of legal
controversies. The Supreme Court, the ultimate interpreter of the
United States Constitution, has also functioned as the ultimate in-
terpreter of the federal system. 10 Some critics have chastised the
Court for presumptuously assuming a task that interjects the judi-
ciary into matters of policy because federalism cases often concern
questions of the proper scope and focus of governmental action.1
They argue that Congress, a democratically composed representa-
tive body, is better suited to the task of determining policy than
the Court. Other commentators, however, have questioned this
evaluation and have argued in favor of the Court's suitability as an
arbiter of federalism on both historical 12 and practical ' s grounds.
5. See generally FEDERALISM: MATURE AND EMERGENT (A. MacMahon ed. 1955).
6. See Grodzins, Centralization and Decentralization in the American Federal Sys-
tem, in A NATION OF STATiS: ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 1-23 (R. Goldwin
ed. 1961).
7. See D. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM, A VIEW FROM THE STATES 1-46 (2d ed. 1972).
8. See N.Y. Times, June 1, 1981, at Al, col. 1.
9. Grodzins, The Federal System, in GOALS FOR AMERICANS: THE REPORT OF THE PRES-
IDENT'S COMMISSION ON NATIONAL GOALS 265 (1965).
10. See D. ELAZAR, supra note 7, at 155-58.
11. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEw AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 171-
258 (1980). See generally Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The
Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Wechsler, The Political Safe-
guards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
12. See, e.g., J. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT AS FINAL ARBITER IN FEDERAL-
STATE RELATIONS 1789-1957, at 3-17 (1958); text accompanying notes 84-98 infra.
13. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L.
,REv. 846 (1979).
Professor Kaden, for example, argues in favor of the judiciary as an arbiter of federal-
ism because he finds Congress to be insufficiently sensitive to state autonomy. He feels that
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The Supreme Court itself has historically vacillated between the
two positions, sometimes deferring 14 and at other times dictating15
to Congress the terms of the federal relationship.
Federalism issues extend beyond the relationship between the
national and state governments. Federalism is more than the mere
reconciliation of national with state sovereignty. The term encom-
passes a cluster of competing values, including efficiency, equity,
uniformity, localism, pluralism, and diversity."' Some commenta-
tors have interpreted the modern Supreme Court's federalism deci-
sions as evidence of a balance of these competing priorities.17 The
Supreme Court, however, has never formally announced its use of
a balance or the particular weight assigned to any one competing
value. 8 The Court has been content to allow the myth of federal-
ism as a paragon of government to be confused with the reality of
federalism as a process for implementing policy choices. This Note
suggests that the separation of the myth of federalism from the
reality is a sine qua non to a clear consideration of the Supreme
Court's proper role in federalism issues. Meaningless phrases such
as "state sovereignty" that have been employed with talismanic ef-
fect should be discarded"' because they invoke the myth, adding
nothing but confusion to a consideration of the reality.
The Supreme Court's confusion of the myth with the reality of
federalism is pernicious to harmony in the federal system because
it ignores American federalism's historic10 and contemporary l na-
the decline in the importance of national and state party organizations, the growing impor-
tance of the national media, the advantages of wealth and incumbency in congressional elec-
tion campaigns, and the vested interest of many state bureaucrats in federal programs have
all operated against the preservation of state sovereignty interests by the political branches.
Thus, in Kaden's view, only the judiciary is both powerful and impartial enough to protect
and preserve the integrity of the states. See text accompanying notes 82-83 infra.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). See text accompanying
notes 123-27 infra.
15. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), discussed at text
accompanying notes 174-96 infra, and Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), discussed
at text accompanying notes 112-16 infra.
16. See generally FEDERALISM: MATURE AND EMERGENT, supra note 4.
17. Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing National League of
Cities, 11 GA. L. REv. 35 (1976).
18. But cf. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352,
2366 n.29 (1981) (certain federal interests may justify state submission); National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (interpreting majority
opinion as employing a balance of federal and state interests).
19. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976).
20. See notes 32-127 infra and accompanying text.
21. See notes 128-52 infra and accompanying text.
1982] 163
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
ture and disrupts the system's normal outlets for accommodating
interests and assigning priorities.2 2 This Note reviews the history
of American federalism with particular emphasis on a comparison
of the reality of the birth of American federalism with the myth
that shrouds that event.23 The interplay of the several levels of
American government in the federal system has been called "coop-
erative federalism." The Note describes cooperative federalism as a
process and criticizes the use of federalism as a rationale for the
implementation of policy decisions.2 ' The Note next considers the
Supreme Court's current analysis of federalism issues that have
arisen when Congress has exercised its powers under the commerce
clause 25 and identifies the contradictions and confusions that result
when myth and reality are intermingled in the Court's analysis.26
The Supreme Court's recent decisions upholding the Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association,7 and Hodel v.
Indiana," continue to muddy the analysis of the federalism issue
by refusing to distinguish between myth and reality. This Note ar-
gues that the vague test29 articulated by Justice Marshall in Vir-
ginia Surface Mining obfuscates reasoned analysis because it mea-
sures the reality of federalism against the myth-a standard
without form or content. The Court mixes together the several
competing interests and, while invoking the mythical standard for
federalism, actually makes decisions about the division of powers
and functions that amount to choices of policy. Instead, the Su-
preme Court should carefully identify the underlying basis of its
decisions. The Court should separate the competing interests and
22. See notes 149-52 infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 32-127 infra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 128-52 infra and accompanying text.
25. In addition to the commerce power, federalism issues may arise in relation to the
exercise by the national government of many of its delegated powers. For example, exercises
of the spending power by the national government may transgress the traditional bounda-
ries in such fields as education, and public health and safety. The Court has craditionally
dealt with each national power as it independently affects federal relations. Several com-
mentators, however, have suggested a unified treatment for federalism questions. See, e.g.,
Prygoski, Supreme Court Review of Congressional Action in the Federalism Area, 18 DuQ.
L. R.v. 197 (1980); Note, Practical Federalism After National League of Cities: A Proposal,
69 GEo. L.J. 773 (1981). This Note also proposes an analysis that can be utilized for federal-
ism questions arising under many of the delegated national powers. See notes 235-45 infra
and accompanying text.
26. See notes 153-234 infra and accompanying text.
27. 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
28. 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981).
29. 101 S. Ct. at 2366; see text accompanying note 212 infra.
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measure their relative weights. This approach would provide better
guidance for lower courts, minimize conflicts among the several
levels of government, and better reveal the actual role of the judi-
ciary in federalism cases.30 The proposition that Congress rather
than the Court should decide certain federalism issues can be bet-
ter examined when myth is separated from reality. The final part
of the Note tests this proposition within the factual context of the
Supreme Court's surface mining decisions.3 1
II. AMERICAN FEDERALISM
A. Federalism and the Founding Fathers
From its beginning American federalism has been more the
product of circumstances than a philosophical plan. The English
colonists who came to America in the seventeenth century brought
with them the strong sense of local autonomy that had contributed
to the English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution.3 2 The divi-
sion of powers and functions between Court and Country 3 had ac-
customed Englishmen to both a feeling of local autonomy and a
sense of national unity.3' In America the working relationships
that had evolved between the English Crown and Parliament and
the colonies developed into a pragmatic division of power and au-
thority. Geographical isolation from the mother country promoted
colonial autonomy. The day-to-day administrative details fell to lo-
cal governmental bodies within the broad bounds set by the Crown
and Parliament. 5
An inchoate system of federalism developed among the units
30. See notes 235-45 infra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 239-45 infra and accompanying text.
32. See generally H. COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE: WHIG HISTORY AND THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3-40 (1974); C. ROBBINS, THE EIGHT-
EENTH-CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN: STUDIES IN THE TRANSMISSION, DEVELOPMENT AND CIR-
CUMSTANCE OF ENGLISH LIBERAL THOUGHT FROM THE RESTORATION OF CHARLES II UNTIL THE
WAR WITH THE THIRTEEN COLONIES 22-55 (1959).
33. "Country" was the name given to describe the landed lords who, as late as the
eighteenth century, ruled their property almost without interference from the national gov-
ernment. The "Country," political descendents of those lords who supported the Stuart
"Pretender" to the English Crown, was the political opponent of the "Court," the support-
ers of the House of Hanover's claim to rule England. During the eighteenth century the
"Court," as ministers and as members of Parliament, controlled the English national gov-
ernment. See generally P. ZAGORIN, THE COURT AND THE COUNTRY: THE BEGINNING OF THE
ENGLISH REVOLUTION 1-118 (1970).
34. Id.
35. See generally J. ADAMS, PROVINCIAL SocIETY, 1690-1763, at 1-54 (1927); C. DEGLER,
OUT OF OUR PAST 1-74 (1970); C. ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 3-34 (1953).
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of government in the colonies as well. Although the primitive state
of transportation and communication hampered the development
of intercolonial relationships, certain common concerns-defense
against the Indians and against foreign powers, and, later, against
Great Britain-required intercolonial action and resolution.e At
the onset of the American Revolution a general division of govern-
mental powers and functions already existed. When Parliament at-
tempted to assert its power over the colonies in defiance of this
pragmatic division of powers and functions, the colonists devel-
oped a philosophical justification for local autonomy.87 The colo-
nists argued that a sovereign body need not be universally su-
preme, but only with respect to those issues requiring a unified
policy, and that lesser governmental bodies might exercise absolute
and discretionary authority within their appropriate spheres.38
This imperium in imperio-two concurrent sovereigns-an appar-
ent solecism, derived from the assumption that sovereignty ulti-
mately rested neither in the Crown nor in any individual legislative
body, be it Parliament or one of its colonial counterparts, but in
the people.3 9 The justification given for the distribution of power
among several governments, no one of which could claim para-
mountcy, was to keep the central government from amassing "a
degree of energy, in order to sustain itself, dangerous to the liber-
ties of the people.
' ' "4
This theory of concurrent sovereignty, as transferred from the
context of imperial relations between the colonies and the King
and Parliament to domestic relations between the states and the
national government, was not clearly set forth until the Constitu-
tional Convention. Throughout the Revolutionary War years the
colonial press and pamphleteers engaged in only a limited discus-
sion of the nature of the union established under the Articles of
Confederation. One contemporary commentator, however, noted
that the Articles did not create "a body in which resides authorita-
tive sovereignty; for there is no real cession of dominion, no surren-
der or transfer of sovereignty to the national council, as each state
36. See generally J. ADAMS, supra note 35, at 1-54; C. DEGLER, supra note 35, at 1-74;
C. RossrrER, supra note 35, at 3-34.
37. See generally B. BMAYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
22-54 (1967); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 3-83
(1969).
38. See B. BAILYN, supra note 37, at 198-229; G. WooD, supra note 37, at 344-89.
39. See B. BAILYN, supra note 37, at 198-229; G. WOOD, supra note 37, at 344-89.




in the confederacy is an independent sovereignty. ' 41 Rather, the
Articles of Confederation exalted the virtues of local government
and scarcely limited the states in their exercise of independent au-
thority. The language of the second article, that "each state retains
its sovereignty, freedom and independence,"'4 typifies the general
attitude of the entire document. The Articles established a deliber-
ately weak central government, hobbled by a plural executive and
emasculated by the denial of any direct power to tax the people or
the states over which it presumed to rule. For advocates of local
sovereignty such as Thomas Burke of North Carolina and George
Clinton of New York, the Articles created the precise form of gov-
ernment that they had envisioned before the Revolution and for
which they had gone to war. In their view, free government inhered
in local control and the supremacy of the states.43 Over time, these
principles came to be associated with those statesmen known as
the "Antifederalists."
'44
The retention by each state of its individual sovereign prerog-
atives, however, produced disputes over commerce, 4 abuse by for-
eign nations,'4 and a depreciating currency.47 When the inability of
the Confederation's decentralized government to solve these
problems became apparent, critics called "Federalists ' '48 proposed
41. G. WOOD, supra note 37, at 355 (quoting Ezra Stiles, the president of Yale Univer-
sity during the Revolutionary War period).
42. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II, reprinted in 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 1218 app. (1953).
43. See, e.g., M. JENSEN, THE NEw NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING
THE CONFEDERATION, 1781-1789, at 25 (1950); W. MURPHY, THE TRwuMPH OF NATIONALISM:
STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE FOUNDING FATHERS, AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 19-25,
276-77 (1967).
44. See generally J.T. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALiSTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION,
1781-1788 (1961).
45. See generally A. McLAUGHLIN, THE CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1783-
1789, at 59-69 (1962). But cf. M. JENSEN, supra note 43, at 337-42 (arguing that the Articles
of Confederation provided a means for arbitrating commercial disputes among the several
states).
46. See generally A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 45, at 70-81. But cf. M. JENSEN, supra
note 43, at 175 (noting that despite some foreign policy failures there were also successes
and, at least, the new nation was not excluded from world trade).
47. See generally M. JENSEN, supra note 43, at 313-26; A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 45,
at 100-09.
48. The term "Federalist" is a misnomer. In its current usage it signifies one who sup-
ported a strong national government. Prior to the Constitution's ratification, however, "Fed-
eralist" signified those who supported a system of government similar to that established by
the Articles of Confederation. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Gouverneur Morris
"explained the distinction between a federal and national, supreme, Govt.; the former being
a mere compact resting on the good faith of the parties; the latter having a compleat and
compulsive operation." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 34 (M.
1982]
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a stronger national government as the solution. The Federalists en-
visioned a substantial consolidation of powers and functions within
a reconstituted national government.49 Chief among these critics
was James Madison, often called the "Father of the Constitution."
According to some scholars,5 ° Madison did not intend to create a
system of government in which the national and state governments
would coexist as equal partners. Rather, he envisioned "'a due
supremacy of the national authority'" that granted power to "the
local authorities" only in" 'so far as they can be subordinately use-
ful.' "51 At the Constitutional Convention both Madison and James
Wilson5 2 ardently promoted a proportional representation in the
national legislature s and a congressional veto of all state laws that
Congress deemed unjust and unconstitutional.5 They believed
these measures were necessary to prevent a reversion to the
problems that had plagued the Confederation, problems caused by
the unrestrained individual sovereignty of the states.55
The 1787 Constitutional Convention.created an ideal opportu-
nity for debate between those such as Edmund Randolph, who fa-
vored "a strong consolidated union, in which the idea of states
should be nearly annihilated, '" and those such as George Mason,
who desired a confederated union in which the states were sover-
eign for most purposes.57 According to James Madison, the result-
Farrand ed. 1937) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as THE RECORDS]. Only after the
Convention did the supporters of a strong national government begin, for political reasons,
to be known as Federalists. See M. JENSEN, supra note 43, at xiii-xiv. See also A. McLAUGH-
LIN, supra note 45, at 185-86.
49. See A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 45, at 129-38.
50. See, e.g., G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 163 (1981) ("[I]n [Fed-
eralist Paper] No. 37, [Madison said] that it was impossible to draw precise boundaries
between state and federal powers; that experience would be needed to fix them; that com-
promise would make men agree in a process of give and take."); G. WooD, supra note 37, at
525.
51. G. WOOD, supra note 37, at 525 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Sept. 6, 1787)).
52. James Wilson was a representative from Pennsylvania who signed th. Declaration
of Independence and served as a member of the Continental Congress. One commentator
has called Wilson's contribution to the making of the Constitution "second only to
Madison's." W. MURPHY, supra note 43, at 82.
53. See id. at 82-87; G. WOOD, supra note 37, at 525-26.
54. G. WOOD, supra note 37, at 525-26.
55. Id.
56. 1 THE RECORDS, supra note 48, at 24 (emphasis in original).
57. See W. MURPHY, supra note 43, at 67-70. Mason and several other delegates
favored a national government possessing only limited powers. These powers, in their view,
should largely be restricted to relations with foreign governments; power over domestic
affairs should remain in the states.
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ing Constitution created a hybrid plan for a government "'not
completely consolidated, nor . ..entirely federal, [a government]
of a mixed nature, [composed] of many coequal sovereignties.' -158
During the battle for ratification of the Constitution, the Antifed-
eralists criticized the Constitution as the design for an "imperium
in imperio." George Mason warned that two concurrent sovereigns
"cannot exist long "together; the one will destroy the other."59
Moreover, Mason feared that the national government, with its
sweeping authority as the "supreme law of the land," would even-
tually annihilate the independent sovereignties of the several
states.6
The Federalists struggled to refute the Antifederalist doctrine
of sovereignty, according to Professor Gordon Wood, "not by at-
tempting to divide it or to deny it, but by doing what the Ameri-
cans had done to the English in 1774, by turning it against its pro-
ponents."61 The Federalists argued that the source of governing
authority rested with the governed and thus, because the people
themselves, rather than their representatives in the legislatures,
were the final, illimitable, and continuous source of all power, both
the state and federal legislatures could be concurrently and equally
representative of the people.62 Madison wrote in The Federalist,
"The federal and state governments are in fact but different agents
and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and
designed for different purposes." 63 By placing the source of govern-
ment's authority in the people, the Federalists changed the issue
from whether the United States should have a national and uni-
tary republic or a confederated system, to the issue considered at
the Constitutional Convention: How should the powers and func-
tions be distributed among the various branches of the proposed
national government?64
The Virginia Plan, which served as the basis for discussion at
the Convention, assumed the continued existence of the states as
governmental units providing certain functions and possessing cer-
tain powers, even though it proposed an extensive enlargement of
58. G. WOOD, supra note 37, at 529.
59. Id. at 528 (quoting 3 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES 29 (J. Elliot ed. 1834)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 530.
62. Id. at 543-47.
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 292 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
64. See A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 45, at 135-37, 151-54, 163-65, 170.
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the powers of the central government. 5 Under the Virginia Plan
Congress would have the power to define the extent of both its own
authority and that of the states."6 The Plan, however, did not pro-
vide any guidelines for the operation of such a multilevel system of
government. The Plan's advocates purposefully made the proper
division of the powers and functions among the various levels of
government a political decision.6
The representatives of the small states feared the Virginia
Plan's centralization of power in the national government. As an
alternative they offered the New Jersey Plan, which called for an
expansion of the powers of Congress. The Plan provided for the
elevation of all the treaties and acts of Congress to the supreme
law of the land in the several states, enforceable in the state
courts. The New Jersey Plan, however, retained the principle of
state equality in Congress and made the national government's ex-
ecutive directly subject to state control.6 8 The Plan of the small
states clearly had a theoretical premise different from that of the
Virginia Plan proposed by the large states.
The Constitution that emerged from the Federalist-Antifeder-
alist debate was a practical document. The so-called Connecticut
Compromise 9 resolved the problem of representation by creating
one legislative house based on size of population and another
based on equal representation for the states. The Compromise
temporarily appeased those who feared that the Constitution con-
templated a strong central government which would eventually an-
nihilate the independent sovereignties of the several states.70 The
supporters of both the Virginia and New Jersey Plans agreed on
the need for a limited government.71 They disagreed, however,
about how best to construct a government that would possess suffi-
cient power to perform necessary governmental functions, but that
would be unable to encroach upon the people's rights and liber-
ties.7 The two factions realized that, beyond their agreement to
limit government, their notions of how the new government should
65. A. MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE 35 (1964).
66. Id. at 61.
67. Id. The Virginia Plan placed the power to determine both national and state law
in the national legislative branch, a political body. The allocation of power between the
national and state governments was therefore a decision at least partly political.
68. Id. at 62-64.
69. See C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 267-312 (1937).
70. R. LEACH, AMERICAN FEDERALISM 7 (1970).
71. See A. MASON, supra note 65, at 61, 62-64.
72. G. WOOD, supra note 37, at 519-23, 543-46.
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be structured were quite different. To avoid further divisiveness
and the risk of the failure of the Convention, the Founding Fathers
declined to debate the theoretical merits and disadvantages of the
Compromise as a system for ordering man in political society. In-
stead, they concentrated on creating a compromise that would
serve their primary purpose-the preservation of the Union.7 3
In the minds of the men who gathered at the Convention in
Philadelphia in 1787, the Constitution's main purpose was to.pro-
vide a government adequate to meet the problems facing the new
nation in the late eighteenth century. With their common philo-
sophical objective in mind-that of limited government-the
Founding Fathers negotiated a pragmatic compromise rather than
an ideal solution. Although they assumed the existence of a multi-
leveled government with each level concurrently exercising power
over the nation's affairs, the Framers failed to provide guidelines
concerning the precise relationships among the various levels.74
The Framers purposefully left vague the exact nature of the rela-
tionships because it was a sharp point of contention among them.
The Founding Fathers held a spectrum of political beliefs.
Their views represented a variety of social policy choices. They
disagreed among themselves about the nature of the history of the
period and about the best kind of government for the new nation.7
5
Because of this diversity of opinion, credible arguments may be
developed in support of almost any interpretation of the Constitu-
tion one chooses. Conflicting interpretations have occupied many
constitutional scholars, 6 but all their efforts have never produced
any final answers because the vague phrases of the Constitution
permit interpretations couched in terms of the varied hopes, inter-
ests, and beliefs of humanity rather than in terms of knowable
facts.
73. See generally C. WARREN, supra note 69, at 309-12.
74. R. LEACH, supra note 70, at 6-8.
75. See M. JENSEN, supra note 43, at 245-57; notes 43-68 supra and accompanying
text.
76. See, e.g., G. BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1893); C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1956); J. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH (1918); A.
DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1838); A. McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-
TORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1935).
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B. Origins of the Federal Judiciary's Role as Arbiter of the
Federal System
Although the Constitution provides few clues about the proper
division of powers and functions, the Founding Fathers were cer-
tainly aware of the necessity for some authority to arbitrate and
resolve the inevitable disputes concerning the legitimate scope of
federal and state power. 7 Those scholars who have advocated a
theory of state sovereignty insist that only the states can perform
the role of arbiter or judge in these disputes. 78 Others who have
championed a broadly powerful national government give that role
to Congress. 7 9 A third group, whose motives are complex,8 0 argue
that "the framers of the Constitution clearly intended that the
Court should be the umpire of the federal system."8'
The argument that the Supreme Court should be the ultimate
arbiter of the federal system begins with the assumption that the
Constitution contains the plan for the federal system of govern-
ment. Since the Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution, 2 the argument logically proceeds with the proposi-
tion that the Court should interpret the Constitution's plan for
federal relations. Indeed, the Supreme Court necessarily deter-
mines the parameters of the federal system when it interprets the
several sections of the Constitution that establish or limit the pow-
ers of the national and state governments.8 This judicial arbiter
concept had been discussed prior to the Constitutional Conven-
tion,' and at the Convention both Federalists and Antifederalists
eventually supported the concept, although for different reasons.
The Federalists believed that the Virginia Plan's congressional
negative on state laws would provide the best safeguard against the
states' divisive tendencies.8 5 The Antifederalist alternative, the
77. Both the Virginia and New Jersey plans contemplated that the national legislature
would make these decisions. See notes 65-68 supra and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Kilpatrick, The Case for States Rights, in A NATION OF STATES: ESSAYS
ON THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 88.
79. See, e.g., E. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS (1937).
80. Unlike the other two views, the motives of this third group are not based on con-
sistent support for either national or local decisionmaking. Rather, this group assumes that
the Court will adopt an impartial view and will decide on a case by case basis whether the
power in question properly belongs to the national or the local authority.
81. J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 12, at 206.
82. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
83. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV; id. art. VI, § 2.
84. See J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 12, at 4-7; G. WOOD, supra note 37, at 455, 459,
461-62.
85. See A. MASON, supra note 65, at 61.
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New Jersey Plan, approved this provision and even provided for
the use of the national military to enforce Congress' federalism de-
cisions.86 The suggestion of military coercion of the states, how-
ever, made the proposal too distasteful for many delegates, and it
was ultimately defeated. 7 The Convention then settled on a judi-
cial arbiter of federalism disputes.
The selection of the national judiciary as the arbiter of na-
tional-state relations represented a compromise resulting from a
series of parliamentary developments beginning with the Conven-
tion's repudiation of coercion of the states by force and adoption of
coercion of individuals by law. 8 This decision in favor of legal co-
ercion, together with the general willingness to create a national
judiciary, the Antifederalists' demands for a Council of Revision,8
the Federalists' plan for a complete system of inferior national
courts,90 and the substitution of a supremacy clause for the con-
gressional negative, 1 impliedly gave the national judiciary the role
of arbiter of the federal system. While the Federalists did not op-
pose this pragmatic solution, they had little faith in the Supreme
Court's ability to maintain the supremacy of the national govern-
ment through resolution of isolated cases or controversies brought
by and limited to the parties before the Court 2 within the jurisdic-
tion set forth in the Constitution. On the other hand, the Anti-
federalists not only approved the compromise but apparently re-
garded the courts as the best protectors of state prerogatives.9 4
Like their adversaries the Federalists, however, the Antifederalists
did not anticipate that such judicial power would be employed ei-
ther aggressively or with wide effect. They trusted that the courts
would impartially protect the reserved rights of both states and
86. See id. at 64.
87. See J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 158-59
(1966) (reprinting J. MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (G. Hunt
& J. Scott eds. 1920)).
88. See id. at 140, 158-59.
89. See id. at 60-62, 66-67, 596-97, 600-01. Several delegates to the convention, includ-
ing both Federalists and Antifederalists, envisioned a Council of Revision, consisting of the
executive and "a convenient number" of the members of the national judiciary, which, in
one proposed form, would possess the power to veto legislative proposals of both the na-
tional and state legislatures. 2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 42, at 979, 1013-18.
90. See J. MADISON, supra note 87, at 318-19.
91. See C. WARREN, supra note 69, at 164-71.
92. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 12, at 11; G. WOOD,
supra note 37, at 537-38, 552.
93. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
94. See J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 12, at 9-11; 2 THE RECORDS, supra note 48, at 28-
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individuals,95 as well as those of the national government, and that
few cases would arise which would challenge the states within their
spheres of sovereignty.
Despite the general approval of the compromis6, during the
campaign to ratify the Constitution, both James Madison and
Alexander Hamilton9 6 devoted an essay in The Federalist to an
examination of the purposes and the impartial character of the ju-
dicial arbiter in an effort to combat criticism of the broad jurisdic-
tional grants to the new national court system. Madison noted that
although "the tribunal which is ultimately to decide" disputes re-
lating to the boundary of powers and functions between a govern-
ment of the whole and governments of the parts is an aspect of the
national government, "[tihe decision is to be impartially made, ac-
cording to the rules of the Constitution. 97 Although nationalists
such as Madison and Hamilton wrote most frequently about judi-
cial protection of national supremacy against state encroachments,
they recognized that in a converse situation national laws that in-
fringed state rights would also be declared unconstitutional.98
C. Early Supreme Court Federalism Decisions
Historically, Supreme 'Court decisions concerning the appro-
priate boundary lines between state and national authority have
been colored by the political point of view prevalent among the
Court's membership. 9 The pose of judicial impartiality and final-
ity which assumes that the Constitution provides some definite,
identifiable plan for national-state relations supports the myth of
federalism as the paragon of government. In reality, however, the
Constitution is an ideal without detail. In their role as arbiters of
national-state relations, the Justices possess broad discretion in
determining the boundary lines for the division of powers and
functions in the federal system. Over time the Court has shifted
these boundary lines to accord with the political philosophies of its
95. J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 12, at 207.
96. Hamilton vigorously defended judicial review as part of the elaborate system of
checks and balances in the new national government. According to Hamilton, "the courts
were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order,
among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority." THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 485 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
97. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 238 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
98. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 96, at 482.
99. See text accompanying notes 100-27 infra. See generally J. GROSSMAN & R.
WELLS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING (2d ed. 1980).
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changing membership,100 as well as in response to changes in
American society itself.
Much to the surprise of both the Federalists and the Antifed-
eralists, under the stewardship of Chief Justice John Marshall the
Supreme Court established itself as an aggressive arbiter of na-
tional-state relations. In a series of cases the Marshall Court as-
serted national authority by nullifying state laws 0 1 that conflicted
with the Court's "nation-centered federalism"10 interpretation of
the Constitution. The case of Gibbons v. Ogden,103 the Court's first
interpretation of the commerce clause, indicated the Marshall
Court's political perspective. In Ogden the Court examined the
constitutionality of New York's steamboat monopoly law. In de-
fense of the statute the steamboat monopoly's counsel argued that
commerce did not embrace navigation, but merely comprised traf-
fic in commodities. Writing for the Court, Marshall rejected this
view and held that commerce not only embraced navigation but
also included every species of commercial intercourse.104 Marshall's
broad interpretation of the scope of the commerce power has been
the foundation for subsequent extensions of the power of the na-
tional government.10 5 The Ogden decision ascribed to Congress ple-
nary power to regulate commerce. The power to regulate com-
merce, wrote Marshall, is "complete in itself, may be exercised to
its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the constitution."106 These strong statements con-
cerning national power reflected the Marshall Court's political
views that generally favored broad governmental powers when
exercised for national objectives.
10 7
During Roger Taney's tenure as Chief Justice, the pendulum
of power swung partially back towards those with a "state-cen-
tered"108 view of federalism. The Taney Court generally exercised
100. For a humorous phrasing of this phenomenon, see F. DUNNE, The Supreme
Court's Decisions, in MR. DOOLEY: Now & FoRE ER 156 (1954), in which he writes, "[N]o
matter whether th' constitution follows th' flag or not, th' supreme coort follows th' iliction
returns." Id. at 162.
101. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
102. See R. LEACH, supra note 70, at 10-12.
103. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
104. Id.
105. See generally W. CROSSKEY, supra note 42.
106. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196.
107. See generally F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY,
AND WAITE (1937).
108. See R. LEACH, supra note 70, at 12-13. The state-centered theory of federalism
postulates that government generally possesses only a limited amount of power and that the
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more self-restraint than the Marshall Court when confronted with
a case requiring a determination of the boundaries of the federal
system. As John Schmidhauser, a constitutional scholar, has ob-
served, the Taney Court followed "a policy of leaving to the states
the fullest possible freedom of control of their social and economic
affairs." 10 9 In Cooley v. Board of Wardens'" the Taney Court's ex-
amination of the validity of a Pennsylvania river pilotage law de-
cided the question whether under any circumstances the states
could regulate interstate or foreign commerce. Justice Curtis, the
author of the Cooley opinion, upheld the state law and set forth
the precedential rule that when the subjects of regulation demand
diverse treatment, state regulation would be permitted in the ab-
sence of congressional action, but when the subject of regulation
had a national effect or required uniform treatment, Congress pos-
sessed exclusive regulatory authority.""
The Taney Court approached the federalism issue with con-
cern for the protection of the states' role in the federal system
from encroachment by the national government. In contrast, the
Marshall Court had accepted the Federalist view that the chief
danger to a federal system was the tendency of the "parts" to en-
croach upon the powers of the "whole." Because the federalism de-
cisions of both Courts affected American social and economic de-
velopment, as well as the division of powers and functions in the
federal system, they both undeniably had much the same effect as
political choices of policy. In Ogden the Marshall Court defined
the broad and plenary power that the national government pos-
sesses under the commerce clause. In Cooley the Taney Court an-
nounced the theoretical premise of concurrent jurisdiction over
commerce by the states and the national governments. Using the
same clause from the Constitution, the two Courts set two differ-
ent policy courses.
Later Courts attempted, often successfully, to direct American
economic and social development according to their own choice of
policy. In practical effect, the Supreme Court usurped the powers
power of the national government is confined to narrowly construed delegated powers.
Under this theory, any expansion of national power usurps the prerogatives of the states
and the people. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.").
109. J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 12, at 79.




of the national and state legislatures to determine questions of so-
cial and economic policy by its restrictive opinions concerning the
constitutionality of national and state regulations. In Hammer v.
Dagenhart12 the Supreme Court invalidated an act of Congress in-
tended to prevent interstate commerce in products created by
child labor. Writing for the Court, Justice Day declared that "the
act in a two-fold sense is repugnant to the Constitution" because it
both exceeded the authority delegated to Congress over commerce
and infringed on a matter properly reserved to the states.11 Apply-
ing a doctrinaire dual federalism analysis, the Court decried "[t]he
far reaching result of upholding the act. ' 114 In the Court's words,
"[I]f Congress can thus regulate matters entrusted to local author-
ity . . . the power of the States over local matters may be elimi-
nated, and thus our system of government be practically
destroyed."11 5
Although the Dagenhart majority invoked the mythical plan
for the division of powers and functions between the states and
national government as one ground of the decision, Justice Holmes
in a powerful dissent argued that the decision to strike down the
act represented an unjustifiable and inappropriate choice of social
policy by the Court. Holmes observed that "the propriety of the
exercise of a power admitted to exist. . . was for the consideration
of Congress alone" and the Court should not "intrude its judgment
upon questions of policy or morals."116
Although the language in the cases restricting national regula-
tory power frequently raised the mythical standard for national-
state relations, the underlying issue before the Court was often the
policy choice of national regulation versus economic laissez
faire.11 7 In Carter v. Carter Coal Co." 8 the Supreme Court held
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 unconstitutional on
the ground that Congress had not regulated interstate commerce,
but rather had invaded the reserved powers of the states. Justice
Sutherland's opinion reflected the laissez-faire majority's view
112. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
113. Id. at 276.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 280 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes' dissent was a portent of the
view adopted by the Court beginning with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937). His view was echoed again in Justice Brennan's dissent in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 860 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. See E. CORWIN, supra note 79, at 107.
118. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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that certain "local" matters could not be regulated by the national
government under the pretext that the matters "affected" inter-
state commerce. " 9 In Carter the Supreme Court's interpretation of
federal relations effectually blocked congressional regulation of la-
bor conditions, a matter that the individual states were, in a prac-
tical sense, incompetent to deal with independently. The dual fed-
eralism model was the analytical weapon wielded by the supporters
of a laissez-faire social and economic policy against Franklin
Roosevelt's national programs for social and economic reform.
Dual federalism's sharp division of powers and functions between
the nation and the state stifled intergovernmental cooperation in
combating the social and economic problems of the Depression.
12 0
In 1937, however, the Supreme Court turned its back on the
dual federalism model and, in the process, altered its political and
economic policy. The Court's decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp.1 21 to sustain the National Labor Relations Act
against the charge that it exceeded the scope of congressional com-
merce power signaled the Court's new willingness to permit the na-
tional government greater influence on the nation's social and eco-
nomic affairs.122 The Supreme Court completed its judicial change
of faith in United States v. Darby1 2 3 when it upheld the Fair
Labor Standards Act against allegations that it exceeded Congress'
delegated powers under the commerce clause and that it infringed
on the reserved powers of the states in violation of the tenth
amendment. Employing a broad constructionist formula in the tra-
dition of the Marshall Court, the Supreme Court, in an opinion
authored by Chief Justice Stone, sustained the Act as a necessary
and proper implementation of the commerce power. The Court ex-
pressly rejected the restrictive dual federalism mode 1 2 4 in order to
facilitate New Deal social and economic programs. According to
the Darby Court, "The motive and purpose of a regulation of in-
terstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon
the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and
over which the courts are given no control."1 25 This conclusion,
119. Id. at 307.
120. See E. CORWIN, supra note 79, at 262. Dual federalism's delineation of isolated
spheres of sovereignty for national and state governments precluded an overlap of sover-
eignty that would permit cooperative action between the two levels of government.
121. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
122. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950).
123. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
124. Id. at 114-20.
125. Id. at 115.
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noted Chief Justice Stone, "is unaffected by the Tenth Amend-
ment" because the amendment carries no substantive weight of its
own. 126 Rather, the tenth amendment "states but a truism that all
is retained which has not been surrendered.' 27 The Carter deci-
sion's promise to scrutinize congressional objectives and to reject
pretexts for the regulation of commerce was shortlived. On the
contrary, in Darby the Supreme Court announced its plan to exer-
cise only minimal scrutiny of a statute's congressional purpose.
III. FEDERALISM TODAY
A. Cooperative Federalism: Process-Not Policy or Paragon
The premise of cooperative federalism is, simply, that the
multilevel American governmental system is best described as one
government serving one people. 2 8 The late Professor Corwin
wrote, "[T]he National Government and the States are mutually
complementary parts of a single government mechanism all of
whose powers are intended to realize the current purposes of gov-
ernment according to their applicability to the problem in
hand.' 12 9 Thus, cooperative federalism stresses a partnership
among all levels of government in the promotion of policy choices.
Furthermore, the partnership is a pragmatic one in which each
level works with the others to accomplish goals which could not be
achieved by one level alone.
Cooperative federalism theorists argue that no neat division of
functions among the various levels is possible. Police protection,
for example, is often considered a uniquely local function. But in
practice police work requires the cooperation of national, state,
and local governments beginning with the codification of a criminal
code and continuing through enforcement procedures. 30 The shar-
ing of functions has equal importance for governmental responsi-
bilities usually thought to be restricted to the national government.
Foreign affairs,'"' national defense,132 and the development of en-
ergy programs"' are examples of functions often considered exclu-
126. Id. at 123.
127. Id. at 124.
128. Grodzins, supra note 6, at 23.
129. Corwin, supra note 122, at 19 (emphasis in original).
130. See D. ELAZAR, supra note 7, at 11-12, 47, 66, 211.
131. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 8, 10; id. art. II, §§ 2-3.
132. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
133. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979).
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sively national. States and localities, however, often directly and
indirectly influence each of these areas.13 4 The specific mix and
character of the responsibility borne by a certain level of govern-
ment in these areas will, of course, vary in accordance with policy
decisions."'3 But the dominant role sometimes played by one level
of government should neither obscure the underlying collaboration
of the various levels in the functions of government nor serve to
justify policy decisions on federalism grounds.
Perhaps Morton Grodzins best described this interplay of
governments and functions that is known as federalism when he
wrote,
The federal system is not accurately symbolized by a neat layer cake of three
distinct and separate planes. A far more realistic symbol is that of the marble
cake. Wherever you slice through it you reveal an inseparable mixture of dif-
ferently colored ingredients. There is no neat horizontal stratification. Verti-
cal and diagonal lines almost obliterate the horizontal ones, and in some
places there are unexpected whirls and an imperceptible merging of colors, so
that it is difficult to tell where one ends and the other begins. So it is with
federal, state, and local responsibilities in the chaotic marble cake of Ameri-
can government.13 6
Few will dispute that powers and functions often overlap in
the American federal system. In fact, it is often the overlap that
creates intergovernmental disputes about the proper allocation of
powers and functions.3 7 These disputes tend to be fought with
134. The states, particularly those which serve as points of ingress and egress from the
United States, affect foreign relations. Texas and California, for example, have substantial
impact on our relations with Mexico. The migrant worker, welfare, and educational policy
responses of these states to the flow of Mexican natives who regularly cross the border play
a major role in United States-Mexico relations. See generally E. DVORIN & A. MISNER, Gov-
ERNMENT IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 95-97 (1968). In wartime the states have contributed to the
implementation of domestic economic and social programs designed to facilitate the war
effort. The National Guard is one example of joint national and state control of the military.
During peacetime state governors command National Guard units, but during wartime the
President may activate these units. See generally J. FERGUSON & D. McHENRY, THE AMERI-
CAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 471-72, 484-86 (6th ed. 1961). Also, many states have individual
energy programs. See The Race to Develop State Energy Plans, BUSINESS WEEK, March 31,
1980, at 44. See also Note, Nebraska's Legislative Responses to the -Energy Crisis: Solar
Energy, Gasohol, and the Coniservation Ethic, 60 NEB. L. REV. 327 (1981).
135. For example, decisions about the parameters of national participation in local
education or local participation in national welfare programs reflect policy decisions on both
the national and local level about the nature of these programs. The national government, of
course, may preempt state action in common fields under the supremacy clause. U.S. CONST.
art. VI.
136. Grodzins, supra note 6, at 3-4.
137. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352,
2356 (1981) (overlap of federal power over interstate effects of surface mining with states'
power over local land-use).
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sweeping generalities and conclusory statements that confuse the
politically neutral, but fluid process for allocating power and func-
tion with decisions about social and economic policy. They fail to
recognize that the two concepts are independent. Politicians,
spokesmen for business and labor, civic leaders, and local news me-
dia are quick to champion state and local governments as the foun-
dation of American democracy when the national government
deals unfavorably with some issue that holds importance for
them. 3 ' Social and economic conservatives predictably deplore the
insidious undermining of state and local government by the expan-
sion of the national government and its bureaucracies." 9 In con-
trast, liberal critics portray state and local government as the
breeding ground for many of the inequities that plague American
life. These critics characterize state and local government as inept
and often corrupt, overwhelmed by the demands of an increasingly
urbanized society, and handicapped by boundaries that have be-
come irrelevant to changing demographic patterns.40
The classic concerns of federalism-governmental effective-
ness and the protection of liberty through the diffusion of
power141-are rarely the primary concern of these actors in the fed-
eralism play. Rather, the more commonly posed federalism ques-
tions concern issues of social and economic policy.1 4 The debates
focus on the character and propriety of governmental action. For
example, President Reagan's "New Federalism" does not deal with
federalism's classic concerns so much as it seeks to serve "the de-
mands of privatism-the concern to conserve wealth and power in
the private sector, with a concomitant concern to curb government
at all levels.
'143
The focus is on policy choices-the determination of societal
goals-rather than on an accommodation of traditional federalism
138. See id.
139. See, e.g., Kilpatrick, supra note 78. See generally L. FREEDMAN, POWER AND
POLITICS IN AMERICA 304-07 (2d ed. 1974).
140. See, e.g., Jaffa, The Case for a Stronger National Government, in A NATION OF
STATES: ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 106. See generally L.
FREEDMAN, supra note 139, at 287-99.
141. See text accompanying note 40 supra. See generally FEDERALISM: MATURE AND
EMERGENT, supra note 4.
142. See notes 99-127 supra and accompanying text; J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 12,
at 209-10.
143. Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power, 9 TOL. L. REv. 619,
676 (1978) (emphasis in original). See also Schlesinger, Administration Economics: End of
Illusions, Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1981, at 32, col. 3 ("no great growth in the federal establish-
ment over the last 30 years").
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concerns. Decisions about societal goals that affect the allocation of
powers and functions among governmental units may incidentally
impact on traditional federalism concerns. An allocation of powers
and functions that favors state and local government may produce
certain intangible benefits, including the freedom to adapt govern-
ment to local conditions, the opportunity to participate in govern-
ment, and the ability to make government responsive to the desires
of the governed., 4 On the other hand, a tilt in favor of the national
government has its own intangible advantages including equity and
equality of access and opportunity.145 The third option, a general
reduction of government's powers and functions, promotes the val-
ues of individualism and self-reliance.146 These values, however,
are rarely the true issue in federalism disputes.
Cooperative federalism is neither a paragon of government nor
a specific choice of policy. It is not an eternal, immutable principle.
Rather, it is a process that has a fluid form well suited for the
implementation of various choices about social and economic pol-
icy. A discussion of federalism's allocation of powers and functions
should not confuse process with either paragon or policy. As Mor-o
ton Grodzins has noted, "The rhetoric of state and national power
becomes easily and falsely a rhetoric of conflict. 1 47 This confusion
occurs because there exist real differences of opinion about policy
questions. But the conflict about policy should not be carried over
into discussions about the process. In a system of cooperative fed-
144. See R. DAHL, A PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND
CONSENT 172-73 (1967).
Dahl has identified four basic contributions of strong state and local governments to
American democracy:
1. By reducing the workload of the national government, they make democratic govern-
ment at the national level more manageable.
2. By permitting diversity, they reduce conflicts at the national level and thus make
democratic government at the national level more viable.
3. By providing numerous more or less independent or autonomous centers of power
throughout the system, they reinforce the principles of Balanced Authority and Politi-
cal Pluralism ....
4. By facilitating self-government at local levels, they greatly expand the opportunities
for learning and practising the ways of democratic government ....
Id.
145. M. DANIELSON, A. HERSHEY & J. BAYNE, ONE NATION, So MANY GOVERNMENTS 13
(1977).
146. See generally Y. ARIELI, INDIVIDUALISM AND NATIONALISM IN AMERICAN IDEOLOGY
168-80, 322-47 (1964). According to Arieli, individualism is an aspect of liberty. "Self-
reliance and enlightened self-interest, competition and association were the conditions of
liberty and progress, to be preserved even though equality of conditions should perish." Id.
at 326.
147. Grodzins, supra note 6, at 23.
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eralism channels exist through which conflicts about process can be
resolved. These channels are opened by the interplay of such coop-
erative programs as welfare, social security, and environmental
protection. 148 These programs are the joint creations of a national
representative government and state and local jurisdictions. 14 9 As
Professor Wechsler has written, local participation in the political
process "necessitates the widest support before intrusive measures
of importance can receive significant consideration, reacting read-
ily to opposition grounded in resistance within the states."' 150
Moreover, as a process, cooperative federalism requires that all
levels of government share in the implementation of policy. In
practice, this sharing of responsibility results in local governments
determining how best to administer policy within the broad guide-
lines prescribed by state or national authorities. 15' Conflicts among
the several levels of government then occur generally when policy,
not process, is at issue. In such situations the conflict is no longer
about federalism's allocation of powers and functions, but rather
about policy choices that must be left for the political branches to
resolve.
52
B. The Modern Court's Analysis
1. Harbingers of a Judicial Role in Federalism Decisions
Following the Darby decision the Supreme Court practiced a
"hands off" policy with regard to national legislation enacted
under the commerce clause. 53 Together with the Court's defer-
ential treatment of the exercise of national power under the
war15 and spending'55 powers and under the Civil War Amend-
148. See D. ELAZAR, supra note 7, at 29-30 (welfare), 56-57 (social security), 53-54
(environment).
149. See id.
150. Wechsler, supra note 11, at 558.
151. See, e.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 30
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979).
152. See Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279-95 (1957) (Supreme Court's major policy role is to confer
legitimacy on the major politics of the national ruling coalition).
153. See Bogen, The Hunting of the Shark: An Inquiry Into the Limits of Congres-
sional Power Under the Commerce Clause, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 187 (1972).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961); Woods v. Miller Co., 333
U.S. 138 (1948); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946).
155. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947)
(federal program required states to limit political activities of state employees participating
in federal program); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (unless Congress' action is
clearly arbitrary, it alone determines general welfare).
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ments,156 the Supreme Court's pro forma scrutiny of Congress' ex-
ercise of the commerce power amounted to an abdication of the
Court's role as arbiter of federal relations. Some signs, however,
indicated that the Court had not completely abandoned the notion
of federalism limits on national power. In a 1944 decision Justice
Frankfurter argued that the Supreme Court should assume a bal-
anced approach in federalism cases: "The interpenetrations of
modern society have not wiped out state lines. It is not for us to
make inroads upon our federal system either by indifference to its
maintenance or excessive regard for the unifying forces of modern
technology. ' 157 Scholarly studies15 indicating the essential eco-
nomic and social unity of the nation, Justice Frankfurter insisted,
"cannot justify absorption of legislative power by the United
States over every activity."' 59 Justice Douglas later expanded on
Justice Frankfurter's theme when he dissented in United States v.
Oregon,60 a case concerning a conflict between state and national
laws regarding the estate of a decedent who died intestate in a
Veterans Administration hospital. Justice Douglas noted, "The
Tenth Amendment does not, of course, dilute any power delegated
to the national government. . . . But when the Federal Govern-
ment enters a field as historically local as the administration of
decedents' estates, some clear relation of the asserted power to one
of the delegated powers should be shown."'16'
In Maryland v. Wirtz16 2 the Supreme Court groped towards
some limit to congressional power under the commerce clause.
Wirtz concerned a constitutional challenge to two amendments to
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)I 3 : one extended the
Act's coverage of employees in private industry to include "the fel-
low employees of any employee who would have been protected by
the original Act"'' 4 and the other applied the Act to employees of
state-operated schools and hospitals. In a footnote to the majority
opinion upholding both, amendments, Justice Harlan sought to
156. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (extension of the private
conspiracy coverage of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
157. Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 650 (1944).
158. See, e.g., D. ELAZAR, supra note 7; M. GRODZINs, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW
VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1966).
159. Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. at 650.
160. 366 U.S. 643 (1961).
161. Id. at 654 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
162. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
163. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
164. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 188.
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temper the broad language of Wickard v. Filburn,8 5 the Court's
most expansive reading of Congress' powers under the commerce
clause. Justice Harlan stated, "Neither here nor in Wickard has
the Court declared that Congress may use a relatively trivial im-
pact on commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of
state or private activities."'' 8 Only when a statute "bears a sub-
stantial relation to commerce" will the Court uphold the provision
without regard to the insubstantiality of the individual activity
that the statute seeks to regulate. 87 Justice Douglas' dissent in
Wirtz recalled the mythical federalism standard, which reserved
certain powers and functions exclusively to the states. The FLSA
amendments, he stated, "disrupt the fiscal policy of the States and
threaten their autonomy in the regulation of health and educa-
tion."' 5 Douglas suggested that accepting the majority's rationale,
an "enterprise concept" that justified Congress' regulation of activ-
ities which have only a trivial impact on commerce, could enable
Congress virtually to "draw up each State's budget to avoid 'dis-
ruptive effect[s] . . . on commercial intercourse.' "169
The growing sensitivity of the Court to federalism limitations
continued in Fry v. United States.70 Although the Court upheld
the application of temporary national wage controls to state em-
ployees,' 7 ' Justice Marshall emphasized the narrowness of the
Court's holding, carefully noting that the statute was an emergency
measure of limited scope which did not appreciably intrude on
state sovereignty. 72 Justice Marshall's comments about the tenth
amendment are particularly indicative of the Court's renewed re-
gard for federalism limitations on national power. Acknowledging
that the Darby Court had characterized the tenth amendment as a
"truism," Marshall stated that the amendment has significance
and that it "expressly declares the constitutional policy that Con-
gress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States'
165. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Wickard required "a substantial economic effect on inter-
state commerce." Id. at 125. This requirement, however, could be satisfied when a regulated
activity "taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial." Id.
at 128. Cf. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2389, 2391
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (Justice Rehnquist's emphasis that a prerequisite to Con-
gress' commerce power is a "substantial effect on interstate commerce").
166. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196-97 n.27.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 203 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 204-05.
170. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
171. Id. at 545.
172. Id. at 548.
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integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal sys-
tem.' 7 3 In the next term, Marshall's rereading of the tenth
amendment served as the starting point to justify the Court's
reemergence as an arbiter of federalism.
2. National League of Cities v. Usery
The Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery17
4
marked the return of the Court to an unabashed policymaking
role. Usery was the most dramatic and activist commerce clause
decision rendered by the Court in four decades.'75 The majority 76
opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, recalled the rationales of-
fered by the Depression-era Court to justify its obstructionist in-
trusion into questions of economic and social policy. The decision
vacillated somewhat, but ultimately rested on the two traditional
rationales for limiting Congress' power under the commerce clause:
(1) The inherent limits in the reach of Congress' delegated power
over commerce, and (2) the undefined but inviolable governmental
powers and functions reserved to the states.' 77 The primary dis-
tinction between Usery and the older "dual federalism" line of
cases was Justice Rehnquist's characteristic failure to admit the
Burger Court's return to rationales previously rejected by the
Court.
a7 8
173. id. at 547 n.7.
174. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
175. The last commerce clause decision prior to Usery to reject congressional legisla-
tion was Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). See notes 118-20 supra and accom-
panying text.
176. The decision was decided by a 5-4 majority. Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring
opinion but also joined the majority opinion. Nonetheless, several commentators have mis-
takenly characterized the decision as a plurality opinion that has a lesser precedential effect.
See, e.g., Bogen, Usery Limits on National Interest, 22 ARIz. L. REV. 753, 766 (1980); Heldt,
The Tenth Amendment Iceberg, 30 HASTINGS L. J. 1763, 1765 (1979). See also R. WooD-
WARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979). The authors of
The Brethren note, "Blackmun toyed with concurring in the result [in Usery] only, thus
denying Rehnquist his fifth vote to make it a binding precedent. He finally decided to join
Rehnquist's opinion, but to limit its effect by publishing his own separate opinion." Id. at
410.
177. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 842-43.
178. See Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REV. 293,
303-04, 349-57 (1976). Two examples of Justice Rehnquist's misuse of precedent include
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (procedural due process decision denying due process
protection to interest for injury to reputation, inconsistent with prior case law), and Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (restriction of state action doctrine for pur-
poses of applying fourteenth amendment). See also R. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra
note 176, at 408 ("When [Justice] Stevens received his copy of Rehnquist's draft [of the
Usery opinion], he took it home and went over it carefully. Rarely, in five years on the
186 [Vol. 35:161
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In Usery the Court invalidated the amendments to the FLSA,
which set minimum wage and maximum hour requirements for all
state and local employees, stating that the amendments exceeded
the scope of the commerce power insofar as they "operate[d] to
directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral opera-
tions in areas of traditional governmental functions. ' 179 According
to Justice Rehnquist, by increasing state labor costs substantially
the statute could potentially force reductions in state-provided
public services as well as severely restrict states' control over their
own employees.180 In short, stated Rehnquist, "[T]he federal re-
quirement directly supplants the considered policy choices of the
States' elected officials."' 81 The Court seemed untroubled that
these same arguments had been decisively rejected thirty-five years
before1 82 and again dismissed as recently as the previous term in
Fry.183
With a semantic twist that evidenced an implicit balance of
interests, Justice Rehnquist managed to distinguish Fry while si-
multaneously overruling Wirtz.184 He found that the national in-
terest in Fry was more substantial than in Wirtz because nation-
wide inflation affected "the well-being of all the component parts
of our federal system" in a manner "which only collective action by
the National Government might forestall."1 85 The national interest
in the general welfare, however, a goal promoted by the minimum
wage and maximum hour legislation at issue in both Wirtz and
Usery, was not as weighty. As one commentator 88 has noted, "the
Court's distinction of Fry, in which Justice Rehnquist dissented,
represents a statement about the relative propriety of federal ac-
tion in the pursuit of national economic policy and in the pursuit
of federal notions of fairness in employment relations. '187 Thus,
although the Usery Court purported to base its limitation of Con-
gress' commerce clause powers on certain inviolable "attributes of
appeals court, had he seen such a misuse of precedents. Rehnquist 'can't do this,' he told a
clerk the next morning.").
179. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852.
180. Id. at 846, 851.
181. Id. at 848.
182. See text accompanying notes 123-27 supra.
183. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
184. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852-54.
185. Id. at 853.
186. Blumstein, Some Intersections of the Negative Commerce Clause and the New
Federalism: The Case of Discriminatory State Income Tax Treatment of Out-of-State
Tax-Exempt Bonds, 31 VAND. L. REv. 473 (1978).
187. Id. at 533 (footnote omitted).
1982]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
state sovereignty" that the Constitution reserves to the states, 188 in
reality the decision amounted to little more than the substitution
of the Court's choice of social and economic policies for those of
Congress. Justice Rehnquist's ability to distinguish Wirtz from
other equally intrusive legislation enacted under the commerce
power weakened his "attributes of [state] sovereignty" argument
because his distinction admitted that "[t]he limits imposed upon
the commerce power when Congress seeks to apply it to the States
are not so inflexible as to preclude" '18 statutes that coincide with
the Court's own choice of policy.
Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices White and
Marshall, vehemently objected to the majority's invocation of the
mythical federalism standard.190 The Constitution, he argued, rec-
ognizes no restraint on Congress based on state sovereignty when a
delegated power admittedly exists.191 According to Justice Bren-
nan, the majority opinion was grounded on an "abstraction with-
out substance.1 92 Moreover, in an effort to interject the Court into
a policymaking role the majority had made a "purported discovery
in the Constitution of a restraint derived from sovereignty of the
States on Congress' exercise of the commerce power." 193
As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, Usery represents the
Supreme Court's groping search for some analytical formula that
will allow the Court to limit Congress' power under the commerce
clause and thus permit the Court to regain its role as arbiter of
national-state relations. The Usery Court chose to return to prior
doctrines that, in their previous incarnation, had stifled the ability
of the national government to respond to the Depression-era crisis.
The dissent feared the "pernicious consequences" that might flow
from a return to a doctrine that inflexibly restricted national
power.19 4 Justice Brennan argued that the political process pro-
vides adequate safeguards for the federal system and noted that
this position had long ago been advocated by Chief Justice Mar-
shall when he stated,
188. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 845.
189. Id. at 853. Justice Rehnquist's exceptions would include "temporary enactments
tailored to combat a national emergency" such as the wage-price freeze employed to combat
inflation discussed in Wirtz. Id. But cf. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 550, 558-59
(1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (rejecting this exception).
190. Id. at 858-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people,
and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are.., the
sole restraints on which they have relied to secure them from [commerce
power] abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely
solely, in all representative governments.195
The views of the Usery majority and dissent concerning the
proper role for the Court in federalism cases clearly conflict. The
majority suggested that the Constitution contains a plan for the
allocation of powers and functions between the national and state
governments that should be interpreted by the Court. The dissent
rejected this myth and recognized that the division of powers and
functions is fluid and must remain so in order that government
may best respond to a continually changing and increasingly com-
plicated world. Starting from these two opposing premises, Justice
Rehnquist quite naturally saw the Court as the proper arbiter of
federalism while Justice Brennan selected the 'political branches
for this role. In Usery both the dissent and the majority insisted
on the exclusive right of their chosen branch of government to de-
termine the proper federalism balance. In subsequent federalism
cases, the Court has side-stepped the polemic presented by those
divergent views and begun to move towards some intermediate
position. 198
3. The SMCRA Decisions
The Supreme Court's decisions in Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Association'97 and Hodel v. Indiana1 98 are
the most recent attempts to articulate some principled approach to
federalism cases. In two separate opinions, both by Justice Mar-
shall, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977199 despite several constitu-
tional challenges, including claims premised on the inherent limits
of Congress' delegated power to regulate commerce and the tenth
amendment's affirmative protection of the powers reserved to the
195. Id. at 857 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) (emphasis added by Justice Brennan).
196. Justice Marshall's opinions in the SMCRA decisions, see notes 197-234 infra and
accompanying text, point towards a shared responsibility between the Court and the politi-
cal branches about federalism questions. For further analysis, see text accompanying notes
235-45 infra.
197. 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
198. 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981).
199. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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In Virginia Surface Mining plaintiffs0 1 urged the Court to
look beyond the pretext 02 offered by Congress as SMCRA's pur-
pose, the regulation of the interstate commerce effects of surface
coal mining, for SMCRA's underlying purpose, namely the regula-
tion of the use of private lands subject to state control. Thus,
plaintiffs argued that their claim presented the ultimate issue
"'whether land as such is subject to regulation under the Com-
merce Clause, i.e. whether land can be regarded as being "in com-
merce." -)203 The Court rejected this framing of the issue in favor
of its traditional two-step commerce clause inquiry: (1) Whether a
rational basis exists for "a congressional finding that a regulated
activity affects interstate commerce," 204 and (2) "whether the
means chosen by [Congress] is reasonably adapted to the end per-
mitted by the Constitution. 2 0 5 Applying this analysis, the Court
found ample rational basis for Congress' finding, supported in the
legislative record,20 6 that "regulation of surface coal mining is nec-
essary to protect interstate commerce from adverse effects that
may result from that activity. ' 20 7 In addition, the Court found that
SMCRA's challenged provisions were reasonably related to the
stated congressional purpose of controlling the adverse economic
and environmental interstate effects of surface coal mining.208
200. Plaintiffs also alleged that certain provisions of SMCRA effected an uncompen-
sated taking of private property in violation of the just compensation clause of the -fifth
amendment, and that some of SMCRA's enforcement provisions violated procedural due
process requirements and equal protection guarantees. The Court held that SMCRA is not
vulnerable to plaintiffs' pre-enforcement constitutional challenges. Hodel v. Indiana, 101 S.
Ct. 2376, 2381 (1981); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct.
2352, 2359 (1981).
201. Plaintiffs in Virginia Surface Mining were an association of coal mining opera-
tions in Virginia, some of its member coal companies, individual landowners, the Common-
wealth of Virginia, and a town. Plaintffs in Hodel v. Indiana were the State of Indiana and
several of its officials, the Indiana Coal Association, several coal mine operators, and others
whose property rights SMRCA would potentially affect.
202. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. at 2358-59.
Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Court would look behind stated congres-
sional purpose to discover underlying effect of legislation).
203. 101 S. Ct. at 2359 (quoting Brief for Appellees at 12 (emphasis in original)).
204. Id. at 2360 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
262 (1964)).
205. Id. (brackets in original).
206. Id. at 2361-62. For an analysis of SMCRA's legislative history, see A Symposium
on the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 553 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Symposium].
207. 101 S. Ct. at 2362.
208. Id.
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In its analysis of possible tenth amendment affirmative limita-
tions on Congress' commerce power, the Court noted the district
court's heavy reliance on Usery's vaguely stated rationale. Al-
though the lower court had acknowledged that SMCRA "ulti-
mately affects the coal mine operator," it had held that because
SMCRA interferes with the states' "traditional governmental func-
tion" of regulating land use, SMCRA contravened the tenth
amendment's affirmative protection of the states' reserved pow-
ers. 209 According to Justice Marshall, the lower court had misread
Usery. In Usery, he explained, the Court had drawn a sharp dis-
tinction between congressional regulation of areas of private en-
deavor that fell within the province of both the nation and the
state of their residence, and congressional regulation "directed not
to private citizens, but to the States as States." 2.10 Although the
tenth amendment did not restrict congressional power over private
parties, it did operate to prohibit regulation of the states qua
states when Congress' exercise of its commerce power "displace[d]
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions.
'211
Justice Marshall expanded on the vague Usery rationale by
formulating a three-pronged test that any challenger to Congress'
commerce power must pass:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the
"States as States." Second, the federal regulation must address matters that
are indisputably "attributes of state sovereignty." And third, it must be ap-
parent that the States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair




Applying this test, the Court rejected the tenth amendment chal-
lenge because SMCRA operated to regulate private parties, not
"States as States."213 Moreover, as Justice Marshall observed,
SMCRA does not coerce the states "to enforce the steep-slope
standards, to expend any state funds, or to participate in the fed-
eral regulatory program in any manner whatsoever."2 14 Consistent
209. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 432
(W.D. Va. 1980), rev'd sub noma. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101
S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
210. 101 S. Ct. at 2365 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845
(1976)).
211. Id.





with SMCRA a state may decline to shoulder any regulatory bur-
den 215 or, if it so chooses, a state may design an enforcement pro-
gram within a broad range of options provided that certain mini-
mum standards set forth in the Act are met.-16 In short, SMCRA
does not dragoon the states into forced participation in a federal
program. As Justice Marshall noted, the Act merely "establishes a
program of cooperative federalism" that allows the states to struc-
ture a program "to meet their own particular needs.
217
In his concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist reflected on "one
of the greatest 'fictions' of our federal system"-the notion "that
the Congress exercises only those powers delegated to it, while the
remainder are reserved to the States or to the people." 1 8 The Su-
preme Court, observed Justice Rehnquist, has broadly construed
Congress' powers under the commerce clause. Nonetheless, he in-
sisted, "there are constitutional limits" to this power 21 9 that are
not exclusively based on the public-private distinction articulated
in the Court's SMCRA opinions. In Rehnquist's view, "some activi-
ties may be so private or local in nature that they simply may not
be in commerce. ' 2 0 According to Justice Rehnquist, to be subject
to congressional regulation an activity must have a substantial ef-
fect on interstate commerce. This substantial effect, he indicated,
"is itself a jurisdictional prerequisite for any substantive legislation
by Congress under the Commerce Clause."2'1 Thus, in Justice
Rehnquist's view, congressional legislation must meet two different
215. Id. Cf. Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 431
U.S. 99 (1977) (The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that certain regulations promul-
gated by the EPA which sought to coerce the states' implementation of federal environmen-
tal law under the Clean Air Act unconstitutionally intruded on state sovereignty. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari but vacated the grant when the EPA voluntarily withdrew
and revised the offending regulations).
Significantly, although Justice Marshall does not say that the national government can-
not constitutionally coerce state action under its commerce power, he does point out that
SMCRA does not coerce the states. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n
101 S. Ct. at 2366 (1981). See also Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243,
1247 (1968). ("To many, the word coercion implies arbitrary decisions of distant and irre-
sponsible bureaucrats; but this is not a necessary part of its meaning. The only kind of
coercion I recommend is mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by a majority of the people
affected.")
216. 101 S. Ct. at 2366.
217. Id.
218. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2389, 2389
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
219. Id. at 2390 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
220. Id. at 2391 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
221. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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challenges while state legislation must meet only one. Both state
and national legislative authorities must observe the prohibitions
contained in the Constitution, but only Congress must prove that
its power to regulate is based on a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
222
4. An Analysis of the SMCRA Decisions
Even if narrowly construed, the Supreme Court decisions
unanimously upholding the constitutionality of the federal strip
mining law constitute a strong endorsement of the power of Con-
gress to impose environmental regulations on recalcitrant states
and property owners. This "unwelcome legal victory for the Gov-
ernment"2  reaffirmed Congress' generally broad authority under
the commerce clause, but also shed some light on the possible
limits to that power.
The SMCRA majority opinions contain two inconsistent ap-
proaches to Congress' exercise of its commerce powers. The opin-
ions, on the one hand, defer to congressional judgment concerning
the proper purpose and means of implementing its commerce pow-
ers.22 4 On the other hand, they articulate a test, apparently based
on the tenth amendment, which portends an intrusive determina-
tion by the Court concerning which congressional policy choices
may be precluded by affirmative constitutional limits.2 25 In the
SMCRA cases the Court rejected challenges based on the states'
inviolable powers and functions reserved by the tenth amendment
because they failed to pass the first, and analytically easiest, part
of Justice Marshall's three-pronged test-whether the national
regulation operates to control states rather than private parties.226
The determination of the second part of the test-whether a fed-
222. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
223. N.Y. Times, June 16, 1981, at B9, col. 1, B9, col. 4. Secretary of the Interior
James G. Watt is an adamant foe of the stripmining law. Even as the Court was deciding
the SMCRA decisions Secretary Watt was moving to reduce the staff of the Office of Surface
Mining, the agency charged with enforcing the statute. At the time the Court granted certio-
rari in the SMCRA cases, Secretary Watt headed the Mountain States Legal Foundation, a
politically conservative public interest law firm. In that role, he filed a brief on behalf of the
coal mining industry arguing that SMCRA "usurped state government functions" and was a
step in the "continuing trend toward centralized decision-making that threatens to destroy
the Federal structure of government in America." Id.
224. See text accompanying notes 204-08 supra.
225. See text accompanying note 212 supra. But cf. text accompanying notes 218-22
supra (Rehnquist's concurrence in the SMCRA decisions in which he states that congres-
sional commerce powers must be based on a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
226. See text accompanying notes 209-17 supra.
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eral statute regulates "matters that are indisputably 'attributes of
state sovereignty' "22 7 -constitutes a more difficult task.
The vagueness of the phrase "attributes of state sovereignty"
complicates the second step of the analysis. The Court has offered
little guidance about this ambiguous aspect of its test. Aside from
each state's internal political process 228 and, apparently, the deter-
mination of the wages and hours of certain employees, 229 the lower
courts and Congress cannot easily determine which matters must
be reserved exclusively to the states. The second step of the test is
also problematic because, in its practical operation, the American
federal system shares most governmental functions among its sev-
eral levels. 3 ° Moreover, the implementation of any nationwide so-
cial or economic policy requires the compliance of state govern-
ments because the states increasingly affect the national welfare.3 1
This necessary cooperation among levels of government makes the
Court's attempt to single out certain functions as "attributes of
state sovereignty" a determination which may conflict with policy
decisions of the states as well as of the national government.
The third part of the test-whether "the States' compliance
with the federal law would directly impair their ability 'to struc-
ture integral operations in areas of traditional functions' ",232 -fur-
ther creates the opportunity for judicial policymaking in defiance
of the political branches. It is doubtful whether any principled ap-
proach can guide the judiciary in its construction of such ambigu-
ous phrases as "integral operations" or "areas of traditional func-
tions." Moreover, in an ever-changing world that frequently
requires imagination and innovation to deal with novel and com-
plex problems, a test that shackles the national government to an
observance of "areas of traditional functions" threatens a repeti-
tion of the scenario enacted by the Depression-era Court in which
national power was thwarted because it conflicted with the Court's
227. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. at 2366.
228. But cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (Court may determine that state
legislative apportionment scheme constitutes an invidious discrimination violative of rights
protected by the equal protection clause); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (state legisla-
tive apportionment schemes are justiciable).
229. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (police and firemen).
Usery's overruling of Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), implies that the federal gov-
ernment may not constitutionally use its commerce power to regulate the wages and hours
of state employees in schools and hospitals.
230. See notes 128-36 supra and accompanying text.
231. See D. ELAzAR, supra note 7; Schlesinger, supra note 143 (state government has
grown at a much faster rate than the federal government).
232. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. at 2366.
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laissez-faire philosophy. Similarly, Justice Marshall's test provides
the Court with a tool for use whenever the Court disagrees with
congressional policy.
The Supreme Court's modern test, however, is not as rigid as
classic doctrinaire dual federalism. In a footnote to Virginia Sur-
face Mining88 the Court carefully warned that even the satisfac-
tion of the test was no assurance that a federal regulation would
fail because "the nature of the federal interest advanced may be
such that it justifies State submission. 22" Thus, the Court's ap-
proach falls somewhere between a rigid, but at least principled,
dual federalism model, and a balance of national and state inter-
ests. This half-way approach provides no guidance to lower courts
that must deal with questions concerning the "proper" allocation
of governmental powers and functions. The primary use of the ap-
proach can only be as an ex post facto justification for an ad hoc
judicial policy decision.
5. A Proposed Pragmatic Analysis
Justice Marshall's test assumes the existence of some defini-
tive standard, established by the Founding Fathers, by which the
allocation of powers and functions in the federal system must be
measured. His test assumes that such a standard is the paragon for
ordering men and women in political society and that its principle
is suited for all people, in all situations, for all time. The paragon,
however, is a myth. The Founding Fathers were pragmatists,
rather than divinely inspired political philosophers. They purpose-
fully avoided allocating powers and functions among the levels of
the new government285 because they could not agree among them-
selves on the proper allocation for late eighteenth-century
America, much less for all time. The Constitution nowhere defines
either "attributes of sovereignty" or "integral operations in areas
of traditional [state] functions." Rather, it contemplates that such
decisions will be made by the political branches within the broad
bounds set by the operation of powers delegated to the national
government and implemented through the necessary and proper
clause.2" The Supreme Court naturally has some role in determin-
233. Id. at 2366 n.29.
234. Id.
235. See notes 72-75 supra and accompanying text.
236. See Berns, The Meaning of the Tenth Amendment, in A NATION OF STATES: ES-
SAYS ON THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 126-48. Berns argues that the
meaning of the tenth amendment is beyond legitimate dispute, that it is merely declaratory
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ing federal relations, and there are some limits to Congress' dele-
gated powers.23 The Court's proper role in federalism questions,
however, is limited to an interpretation of the scope and breadth of
the delegated powers, together with a determination of whether
national laws are, in light of contemporary circumstances,2 3 8 "nec-
essary and proper" to the exercise of the delegated national
powers.
Thus, the role of the Court, once the existence of national
power is ascertained, is to determine whether a particular law is a
necessary and proper exercise of that power. This determination
involves a limited balancing of competing interests. Although judi-
cial balancing inevitably amounts to judicial policymaking, an
acknowledgment that the Court is choosing among competing in-
terests would at least be a straightforward approach. Once the Su-
preme Court has identified certain interests that carry greater
weight than others, lower courts, as well as the national and state
legislatures, can determine for themselves which interests shall
prevail. Such an approach will allow the Court to reassume a lim-
ited role as arbiter in federalism questions and will allow Congress
to make most decisions while reserving to the Court a veto over
particularly egregious attempts by the national legislature to over-
step the bounds of its delegated powers in setting national policy.
Moreover, the proposed analytical approach corresponds with the
reality of cooperative federalism's interplay among several govern-
mental units. It rejects the myth of rigid spheres of sovereignty
and recognizes the overlap of governmental power and responsibil-
ity. The SMCRA situation provides a useful context in which to
examine the application of this approach. First, one must deter-
mine whether surface mining possesses a sufficiently rational con-
of the distribution of powers in the Constitution, that the attempts to rely on it for a rule of
constitutional law rather than of construction require a distortion of the text of the amend-
ment, and that the decisive argument concerns the meaning of the necessary and proper
clause.
237. See text accompanying notes 82-98 supra.
238. The determination of what is a "necessary and proper" implementation of a del-
egated power must respond to a changing world. The Framers could not envision all possible
situations that might require action by the national government. For example, they could
not foresee mass urbanization, an energy crisis, or the problems of environmental degrada-
tion. Similarly, the problems of tomorrow cannot be predicted with accuracy today. A rigid
definition of what is necessary and proper can no more be made today than it could in the
late eighteenth century. Cf. Jackson, Introduction to M. RAMASWAMY, THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, at v (1948) (Justice Jackson noted that
the commerce clause "prescribed an allocation between states and nation of power over ac-
tivities that [the Framers] could not have foreseen").
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nection with commerce to fall within Congress' commerce power,
and if it does, whether the means chosen are reasonably related to
congressional goals.239 The Court is customarily deferential to Con-
gress in this part of the test. In view of the legislative findings con-
tained in SMCRA, surface mining has substantial24 0 effects on in-
terstate commerce and the Act's regulatory scheme is reasonably
related to congressional goals. Thus, SMCRA would pass step one
of the test.
Second, the proposed approach requires a determination of
whether the regulation of the interstate commerce effects of sur-
face mining is a necessary and proper exercise of congressional
commerce power. This determination requires balancing the inter-
est of the national government in controlling the adverse nation-
wide environmental and economic effects of surface coal mining
with the states' general interest in controlling land-use within their
borders. In his concurring opinion in Usery Justice Blackmun sug-
gested that the national government has a great interest in envi-
ronmental regulation2 ' 1 The basis for this great interest is multi-
fold. Environmental protection 'safeguards an interest that has
widespread raiifications which the individual states cannot ade-
quately serve.2 2 Moreover, environmental protection provides a
public good that the private sector cannot supply.243 On the other
hand, the states' interest in controlling land-use is a general inter-
est that serves largely intangible values, including the opportunity
for local citizens to participate in land-use decisions and the ability
to make such decisions responsive to the needs and desires of those
who will be affected.2  Such values, however, can be served in
other ways. For example, a national program regulating land-use
239. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
240. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(j) (Supp. III 1979) (surface coal mining affects interstate com-
merce, contributes to Nation's economic well-being, and should be conducted with a concern
for the Nation's environment). See generally Symposium, supra note 206.
241. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring). Blackmun states, "lt seems to me that [the Court] adopts a balancing approach,
and does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the
federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed
federal standards would be essential." Id.
242. See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALz L.J. 1196, 1197 n.5 (1977)
("land-use planning or natural resources management, where the obstacles to realization of
national policies may be even greater than in the field of pollution control").
243. See Hardin, supra note 215, at 1244-45.
244. See generally D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROLs LEGISLATION
(1977); Stewart, supra note 242, at 1232-33.
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can be tailored to provide for adaptation to local conditions, and to
permit local participation in the decisionmaking process.2 45 Thus,
after balancing the competing interests, the national interest in
regulation of the interstate effects of surface mining outweighs the
state interest, which is more general, less concrete, and which may"
be served even under a national regulatory scheme.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has paid homage to the myth of federal-
ism as a paragon of government for far too many years. Although
federalism is an abstract ideal without specific form or content, the
Court has used the myth to justify its choice of public policy and
its role as arbiter in federalism decisions. The Founding Fathers
were pragmatic men who realized the dangers and difficulties in-
herent in a rigid allocation of powers and functions between the
governments of the nation and the states. Thus, they declined to
delineate any particular division and, instead, left the choice for
each generation.
During the era of the Depression, the Supreme Court used the
myth of federalism to justify the imposition of its policy choice and
to constrain the ability of the national government to deal with the
grave problems caused by the general economic collapse. Then, in
an abrupt about-face, the Court swung to the opposite extreme
and virtually abdicated its role as arbiter of federalism. Recently,
the Justices have begun to move towards some participation in
federalism decisions. To this end, the Court's recent decisions have
resurrected the myth of federalism and confused the analysis of
federalism issues.
The Supreme Court's SMCRA decisions, summarizing the
vague Usery rationale, articulated a test that continues to confuse
the mythical federalism standard with the Court's pragmatic
choice among competing values. This Note argues that such a test
provides no guidance for the lower courts and interferes with the
operation of cooperative federalism. As an alternative, the Note
proposes that the Court reveal the underlying basis for its federal-
ism decisions. The Court should recognize the cluster of competing
245. SMCRA is designed to maximize these values, but it contains imperfections. The
factual context of Virginia Surface Mining provides one example. There, SMCRA's require-
ment that strip-mined land be returned to its "approximate original contour" was economi-
cally infeasible and physically impossible in Virginia's steep-slope areas. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 433-34 (W.D. Va. 1980), rev'd sub
nom. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
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interests and assign weights to each interest. Such an approach
would allow the Court a role in federalism issues, but would permit
the political branches to make most decisions about the allocation
of powers and functions in the federal system. Such decisions
could then begin from a premise of cooperation, rather than
conflict.
The Note employs its proposed approach in the context of a
commerce clause question, but a similar analysis may be used in
relation to questions concerning other exercises of national power.
The approach rests on the determination of whether the exercise
of national power is a necessary and proper use of a delegated
power in light of competing interests affected by such use. Unlike
the Usery Court's approach, this Note suggests an analysis that
can be used in many different contexts because it is not premised
upon inherent limitations to the commerce power. Moreover, this
approach is grounded in pragmatic conditions rather than in an
ethereal abstract analysis. It seeks to banish the confusion of myth
and introduce the clarity of reality.
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